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DNA PROFILES, COMPUTER SEARCHES, AND 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
CATHERINE W. KIMEL† 
ABSTRACT 
  Pursuant to federal statutes and to laws in all fifty states, the United 
States government has assembled a database containing the DNA 
profiles of over eleven million citizens. Without judicial authorization, 
the government searches each of these profiles one-hundred thousand 
times every day, seeking to link database subjects to crimes they are 
not suspected of committing. Yet, courts and scholars that have 
addressed DNA databasing have focused their attention almost 
exclusively on the constitutionality of the government’s seizure of the 
biological samples from which the profiles are generated. This Note 
fills a gap in the scholarship by examining the Fourth Amendment 
problems that arise when the government searches its vast DNA 
database. This Note argues that each attempt to match two DNA 
profiles constitutes a Fourth Amendment search because each 
attempted match infringes upon database subjects’ expectations of 
privacy in their biological relationships and physical movements. The 
Note further argues that database searches are unreasonable as they 
are currently conducted, and it suggests an adaptation of computer-
search procedures to remedy the constitutional deficiency. 
INTRODUCTION 
Having paid your debt to society, you are finally walking out the 
jailhouse door. And as you shake the prison dust off your feet, you 
resolve—successfully, as it turns out—never to commit another crime. 
No more frightening inmates. No more warden’s ever-watchful eyes. 
You are free again, now and for the rest of your life. 
 
Copyright © 2013 by Catherine W. Kimel. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2013; University of North Carolina at 
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Or are you? Under the federal system and in every state, the 
government creates databases to store the DNA of every person 
convicted of a prescribed subset of offenses.1 Law enforcement offices 
then search these databases one hundred thousand times a day, 
seeking, in the absence of any individualized suspicion, to bring 
unsolved crime after unsolved crime down upon database subjects’ 
heads.2 
This Note addresses the Fourth Amendment issues implicit in 
database searches of genetic profiles that are created after and 
because subjects were convicted of a statutorily designated crime. 
DNA-collection statutes have received a great deal of scholarly 
attention, but existing scholarship has focused almost exclusively on 
the initial extraction of DNA samples.3 Moreover, scholars have 
assumed that if a sample’s extraction is constitutional, then 
subsequent searches of its corresponding genetic profile must be 
constitutional as well.4 
This Note is the first work squarely to question that assumption. 
It argues that comparisons of genetic profiles are Fourth Amendment 
searches because they reveal new information about subjects’ 
biological relationships and their physical presence. Therefore, courts 
should require police to obtain a warrant before they compare two 
genetic profiles, just as police must obtain a warrant before searching 
 
 1. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 84648 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
 2. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1391 (2008). 
 3. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search 
Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do, 34 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 165, 17881 (2006) (arguing that the “Louisiana and Virginia laws that authorize the 
taking of DNA samples from certain arrestees” are unconstitutional). 
 4. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment 
and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 875 (2006) (“[O]nce the police lawfully collect 
DNA for one investigation, the Fourth Amendment permits reanalysis of that sample for a 
wholly separate investigation.”); David H. Kaye, DNA Database Trawls and the Definition of a 
Search in Boroian v. Mueller, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41, 4445 (2011), http://www. 
virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2011/08/04/kaye.pdf (defending the First Circuit’s holding that the 
government is constitutionally permitted to “retrawl” the DNA profiles in its database “ad 
infinitum”); D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, 
Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 424 (“[T]here is 
no ‘search’ when a lawfully acquired profile is entered in the database or is compared to the 
profiles from unsolved crimes.”); Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 83031 (2010) (claiming that database searches do not 
warrant the same “tenor of concern” as “physical confrontations, or even informational 
inquiries” and that a suspicion-based model is an ill-adapted means of regulating DNA-database 
searches). 
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a government-owned copy of a suspect’s computer for evidence of a 
separate crime. This Note argues that procedures for searches of 
computers provide more than a ready model for DNA-database 
searches—rather, the DNA-database context actually justifies 
computer-search procedures better than computer searches do, and 
computer-search procedures would protect genetic privacy more 
effectively than they protect electronic privacy. 
Part I introduces DNA, DNA databases, and the evolution of 
DNA-collection statutes. Part II provides a brief overview of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. Part III draws upon that doctrine to argue that 
DNA-database searches are Fourth Amendment searches because 
the government violates weighty privacy expectations when it 
compares two genetic profiles. Finally, Part IV argues that the 
constitutional requirements of computer-search procedures highlight 
deficiencies in current DNA-database search procedures, and it 
questions whether society truly believes that electronic privacy is 
more important than genetic privacy—and thus whether current 
policies accurately reflect the country’s social values. 
I.  BACKGROUND: DNA, CODIS, AND COLLECTION STATUTES 
To understand the constitutional significance of DNA-database 
searching, it is important first to understand exactly what information 
is being searched in the databases and how this information comes 
into the government’s possession. This Part will briefly explore DNA 
as genetic material and as evidence and then will explain the history 
and process of DNA-database construction. 
A. DNA and DNA Profiling 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is present in most human cells.5 
DNA contains a sequence of genetic code that is three billion 
nucleotide base pairs long;6 each sequence contains instructions for 
the production of the proteins essential to “the structure, function, 
and regulation” of every part of an individual’s tissue and organs.7 
Thus, DNA constitutes predictive evidence of multitudinous aspects 
 
 5. Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 309, 314 (2010). 
 6. International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME 
RESEARCH INST. (Apr. 14, 2003), http://www.genome.gov/11006929. 
 7. What Are Proteins and What Do They Do?, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED. (Nov. 5, 
2012), http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/howgeneswork/protein. 
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of an individual’s mind and body, including the presence or future 
development of over four thousand heritable diseases.8 Indeed, 
scientists now have decoded all three billion of the human genome’s 
nucleotide base pairs9 and have determined that “[m]any, if not most, 
diseases have their roots in our genes.”10 
The task of DNA profiling is to whittle this overwhelming 
quantity of genetic information down into one easily comparable 
profile. Profiling is possible because, although the vast majority of 
DNA is identical throughout humankind regardless of biological 
relationship, DNA does contain a relatively tiny number of 
variations, or polymorphisms, that render each individual’s genetic 
material unique.11 DNA profiling exploits these polymorphisms by 
creating a numeric record of the subject’s genome at thirteen 
specified sites known to exhibit strong polymorphic tendencies and 
thought to be noncoding, meaning that those sites are unable to 
predict disease states or predispositions.12 As a result, genetic profiles 
are easily differentiated.13 The DNA-search process compares one 
numerically expressed DNA profile to another and assesses the 
similarities between the two.14 Although the chances are 
infinitesimally small that two people who are not identical twins will 
exhibit the same polymorphisms at all thirteen loci,15 the presence of 
some common variations indicates a biological relationship between 
two profiles’ subjects. The more commonalities, the closer the likely 
biological connection.16 A person can seek to match two profiles at all 
thirteen genetic markers—suggesting common identity between the 
 
 8. Gene Mutations and Disease, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Jan. 28, 2005), http://www.cancer. 
gov/cancertopics/understandingcancer/genetesting/page8. 
 9. International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, supra note 6. 
 10. Gene Mutations and Disease, supra note 8. 
 11. Suter, supra note 5, at 314. 
 12. Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 6566 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 13. See Bruce S. Weir, The Rarity of DNA Profiles, 1 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 358, 369 
(2007) (“[T]he probability that a randomly chosen person has a particular forensic profile can 
easily reach the small value of 10-10.”). 
 14. Suter, supra note 5, at 31920. 
 15. See Matthew Gilbert, Police Seeing Double in Rape Case Involving Identical Twins, 
CNN (June 7, 2004), http://articles.cnn.com/2004-06-07/justice/twins_1_identical-twins-dna-
sample-dna-testing?_s=PM:LAW (recounting a Michigan rape investigation in which DNA was 
the only evidence and the DNA recovered from the scene was a complete match for two 
identical twins, both of whom had prior convictions for sex offenses). 
 16. Suter, supra note 5, at 31819. 
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profiles’ subjects—or one can seek to match profiles at only some of 
the genetic markers—suggesting the subjects’ close kinship.17 
Because DNA profiling and matching involve only thirteen 
purportedly noncoding loci, proponents have touted the process’s 
respect for genetic privacy.18 Even if the thirteen genomic markers 
from which genetic profiles are generated do not indicate health 
conditions, the information contained within a genetic profile still is 
sufficient to establish paternity19 and kinship ties,20 and to predict the 
subject’s race, sex,21 and even surname.22 It also is important to 
remember that our understanding of the human genome is 
incomplete. Scientists continually discover medical value in genetic 
components once thought to be meaningless,23 and it remains entirely 
possible that scientists one day will find that genetic profiles’ 
composite loci code for important health determinants. Some 
evidence indicates that such a discovery is not unrealistic.24 
B. DNA Databasing 
The state’s process for matching two DNA profiles begins with 
the creation of the profiles themselves, which the state then stores in 
searchable databases. The first step in the generation of this profile is 
to extract a biological sample from the subject, usually in the form of 
 
 17. Id. at 325–27. Some law enforcement offices have begun to search for “partial 
matches,” or matches at less than all thirteen loci, which implicate the relatives of the matching 
profile’s subject. Id. at 324. This practice of “familial searching” remains controversial and is not 
yet widespread in the United States. Id. at 32527. 
 18. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000) (stating that the thirteen loci “were 
purposely selected because they are not associated with any known physical or medical 
characteristics”). 
 19. Joh, supra note 4, at 169. 
 20. Suter, supra note 5, at 31819. 
 21. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 22. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1331. 
 23. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Study Discovers Road Map of DNA; A Key to Biology, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A1 (reporting on new studies showing that genetic material previously 
thought to be “junk” DNA in fact controls how genes function and contributes to the 
development of diseases like multiple sclerosis and lupus). 
 24. Suter, supra note 5, at 332 & n.155. This early evidence is, of course, contested. See 
David H. Kaye, Commentary, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 179, 188 (2001) (“Contrary to the assertion in [Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra 
Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data 
Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127 (2001)], all [profile-composite loci] are noncoding, and none is 
known to correlate with any observable traits—stigmatizing or otherwise.”). 
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blood or saliva.25 The government then sends that sample to a state 
forensic laboratory, where state employees construct a genetic profile 
from the sample.26 No federal statute governs the sample’s disposition 
after the profile is created, and states—with the sole exception of 
Wisconsin—retain the tissue samples indefinitely.27 
Once created, the genetic profile is uploaded into the Combined 
DNA Index System (CODIS),28 a national database overseen by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)29 and subdivided into local, 
state, and national levels.30 The uploaded information includes the 
profile itself, a specimen identifier, and identification of the 
laboratory and technician who generated the profile.31 Profiles enter 
CODIS at the local level and subsequently become accessible at the 
state and national levels.32 As of September 2012, the national CODIS 
database contained more than 11,628,300 profiles, 11,176,400 of which 
were derived from voluntary donors and from categories of convicts, 
arrestees, and others whose DNA profiling is authorized or mandated 
by statute.33 When police conduct a CODIS search, they compare a 
 
 25. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 81617. Generally, the sample is taken while the subject is 
incarcerated or is otherwise subject to state control. See, e.g., Bureau of Forensic Services, 
STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://ag.ca.gov/bfs/content/faq.php#dna (last visited Nov. 
20, 2012). However, the government can (and has) taken biological samples for DNA profiling 
surreptitiously from unincarcerated individuals. Joh, supra note 4, at 86062. 
 26. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102i (West 2009 & Supp. 2012). The profile-creation 
process takes twenty-three to thirty weeks. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, 
False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 73233 
(2007). 
 27. Suter, supra note 5, at 334 & n.172. Only eight state statutes explicitly proscribe testing 
for purposes beyond DNA profiling, and many statutes allow sample use for unspecified “law 
enforcement purposes.” Id. at 33536. 
 28. Maclin, supra note 3, at 166. 
 29. Suter, supra note 5, at 316. 
 30. Murphy, supra note 26, at 739. 
 31. Maclin, supra note 3, at 166. 
 32. Id. At all levels of stratification, CODIS profiles are divided into two categories: the 
“Forensic Index,” which contains genetic profiles created from crime-scene samples and 
unidentified human remains, and the “Offender Index,” which contains genetic profiles created 
from compelled samples and samples that were voluntarily contributed to assist an investigation 
(by relatives of missing persons, for example). Suter, supra note 5, at 315–16. For a discussion of 
the scope-of-consent issue surrounding the government’s retention of genetic samples and 
profiles that were given voluntarily, see Kaye & Smith, supra note 4, at 42330. 
 33. CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last updated September 2012). 
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profile generated from a crime-scene sample against each of the 
11,176,400 profiles that constitute the national Offender Index.34 
C. Evolving Authority for DNA Evidence Collection and Databasing 
DNA evidence originally served only to support linkages 
between established suspects and specific crimes. Prosecutors first 
used DNA evidence in the late 1980s and early 1990s35 to shore up 
cases against established suspects through proof that DNA evidence 
found at a crime scene matched the suspect’s genetic profile.36 During 
this period, the state could secure a DNA sample only with a court 
order based upon individualized suspicion, with the suspect’s consent, 
or by investing the time needed to track the suspect and recover an 
“abandoned” DNA sample.37 
Then, in the mid-1990s, Congress and state legislatures began to 
enact statutes that compelled submission of DNA samples from 
people who were not suspects in any investigation and that prescribed 
the creation of DNA databases.38 The early DNA-collection statutes 
generally required a person to submit a biological sample upon 
conviction of a sex offense or a violent felony.39 Since their enactment, 
however, DNA-collection statutes have expanded rapidly in scope. 
The statutes first were broadened to include people convicted of any 
felony.40 Later, the statutes grew to encompass convicted 
misdemeanants.41 The federal DNA-collection statute now authorizes 
the government to extract biological samples from illegal 
 
 34. The FBI and DNA: Part 1: A Look at the Nationwide System That Helps Solve Crimes, 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/ 
november/dna_112311. 
 35. Murphy, supra note 26, at 731. 
 36. Suter, supra note 5, at 315. 
 37. John D. Biancamano, Note, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection 
Statutes and Their Fourth Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619, 620 (2009). 
 38. Maclin, supra note 3, at 166. 
 39. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1329. As of 2008, all fifty states required DNA samples from 
people convicted of sex offenses and certain violent crimes. Kimberly A. Wah, Note, A New 
Investigative Lead: Familial Searching as an Effective Crime-Fighting Tool, 29 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 909, 926 (2008). 
 40. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1329. As of 2010, forty-nine states collected biological samples 
from all convicted felons. Idaho is the only state to resist this trend. DNA Laws Database Topic 
Summaries, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/justice/dna-laws-database-topic-summaries.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2012). 
 41. Murphy, supra note 2, at 132930. As of 2006, thirty-eight or more states required 
biological samples from some subsection of misdemeanants. Rick Weiss, Vast DNA Bank Pits 
Policing Vs. Privacy, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A1. 
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immigrants.42 Finally, many states currently require biological samples 
from some or all arrestees,43 from those acquitted by reason of 
insanity,44 and even from juvenile offenders.45 Meanwhile, CODIS has 
experienced a parallel expansion. The database was conceived as a 
pilot project among fourteen states in 1990, was formalized by federal 
legislation in 1994,46 and was used by all fifty states by 1998.47 
Rather than link identified suspects to specific crimes, the 
distinct purpose of DNA-collection statutes has been to facilitate the 
creation of genetic databases to assist law enforcement in generating 
suspects for unspecified past and future crimes.48 So far, CODIS has 
resulted in “numerous” people being “convicted on the basis of a cold 
 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 43. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1330. Because arrest rates are particularly high among young 
people, arrestee-collection statutes place many Americans under DNA surveillance for 
practically the entirety of their adult lives. See Erica Goode, Many in U.S. Are Arrested by Age 
23, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at A16 (“By age 23, almost a third of Americans 
have been arrested for a crime . . . .”). Nearly half the states have enacted arrestee-collection 
statutes. DNA Collection upon Arrest, NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR SCI., TECH. & THE LAW AT 
STETSON UNIV. COLL. OF LAW (May 2011), http://www.ncstl.org/resources/DNACollection
UponArrest. The federal courts so far have split on whether these statutes are constitutional. 
Corey Preston, Note, Faulty Foundations, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 47576 (2010). 
Most recently, a California state appellate court struck down the portion of California’s DNA-
collection law that required all felony arrestees to submit a DNA sample. People v. Buza, 129 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 44. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.2(3) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.20(g) (West 
2009 & Supp. 2012). It is illustrative of the speed of collection statutes’ expansion that Professor 
Erin Murphy was able to speculate as recently as 2008 that “[a]lthough no such statutes exist, it 
is not difficult to imagine the passage of legislation requiring the collection of DNA samples 
from mentally ill persons or other such individuals—not on the basis of being arrested or 
convicted of a crime, but rather as a result of simply being labeled ‘dangerous.’” Murphy, supra 
note 2, at 1330. 
 45. Suter, supra note 5, at 317. As of 2006, thirty-one United States jurisdictions required 
DNA samples from some juvenile offenders. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DNA 
FORENSICS: EXPANDING USES AND INFORMATION SHARING 2 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=774. 
 46. Maclin, supra note 3, at 166; see also DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, tit. XXI, subtit. C, 108 Stat. 2065, 2069 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006)) 
(“The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may establish an index of . . . DNA 
identification records of persons convicted of crimes . . . .”). 
 47. Maclin, supra note 3, at 166. 
 48. See, e.g., id. at 167 (“[A] spokeswoman of Virginia Delegate Ryan McDougle, who 
sponsored [the bill] to expand the state’s DNA database to cover arrestees, confirmed that the 
legislative intent behind the bill was to match the DNA of violent felony arrestees to DNA 
evidence from unsolved crimes and not to merely obtain the identity of those arrested by the 
state.”). 
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hit alone.”49 As of January 16, 2009, law enforcement offices across 
the country benefited from over 79,000 cold hits that matched DNA 
profiles created from crime-scene samples to the profiles of CODIS 
subjects who had not been suspects in the investigations,50 and the 
incidence of cold-hit matches continues to rise exponentially as 
CODIS acquires more and more DNA profiles.51 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF BASIC FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he overriding function of 
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity 
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”52 The amendment was a 
resounding rejection of colonial America’s experience with general 
warrants and writs of assistance, which had “permitted the King’s 
officials to enter private homes and conduct dragnet searches for 
evidence of any crime.”53 
In keeping with the Fourth Amendment’s purpose of protecting 
personal privacy, “some quantum of individualized suspicion is 
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.”54 Indeed, 
 
 49. Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
291, 296 (2010). 
 50. Laboratory Services: Table 1: Statistics of Cold Hits and Success Rates Based on NDIS 
Data from CODIS, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/oct2009/undermicroscope/table1.htm. 
 51. Murphy, supra note 26, at 740. 
 52. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); see also United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (finding that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to 
protect against “arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy 
and personal security of individuals”); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) 
(“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”). The Fourth 
Amendment itself reads, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 53. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 536 
(2005). See generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 5178 (1937) (describing the role that 
writs of assistance played in precipitating the American Revolution). 
 54. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 667 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“For most of our constitutional history, mass, 
suspicionless searches have been generally considered per se unreasonable . . . .”). 
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the basic Fourth Amendment test for a “reasonable” search is the 
prior issuance of a judicial warrant based upon the state’s proof of 
probable cause55 to believe that the specific individual to be searched 
is or has been engaged in a specific criminal activity, specific evidence 
of which is likely to be found at the specific location listed in the 
warrant.56 Warrants are the standard measure of reasonableness 
because the specificity that warrants require “ensures that the search 
will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the 
character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers 
intended to prohibit.”57 
However, the warrant and probable-cause requirements 
underlying the reasonableness standard do not account for all 
searches sanctioned by the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court 
has carved out numerous exceptions to those requirements,58 finely 
granulating when searches are reasonable without a warrant or 
probable cause in some fact patterns,59 and at other times leaving 
 
 55. See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (“Probable cause exists when ‘there 
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” 
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983))). 
 56. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (noting that a seizure is “per se 
unreasonable . . . unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable 
cause”). 
 57. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). 
 58. For example, special-needs searches are an exception to the warrant and 
individualized-suspicion requirements. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 
(1990). In other circumstances, no warrant is required, but there must be probable cause. See 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987) (“Dispensing with the need for a warrant is worlds 
apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant would require, 
i. e., the standard of probable cause.”). In still other situations, individualized suspicion is 
required, but at a lower level than probable cause, and the warrant requirement is dispensed 
with. See Place, 462 U.S. at 697–79 (holding that an officer’s seizure of personal luggage on the 
basis of reasonable suspicion but without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that an officer behaved constitutionally when he 
patted someone down on the basis of reasonable suspicion but with no warrant). Finally, 
sometimes the warrant requirement persists, but individualized suspicion is deemed 
unnecessary. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) (holding that municipal health 
inspectors constitutionally could conduct a suspicionless administrative search of an apartment, 
but that the tenant had the right to refuse them entry until they obtained a warrant). 
 59. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555–60 (1979) (holding that both prison-cell 
searches and visual body-cavity searches of pretrial detainees are reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 55556 (stating that a vehicle search by roving 
border patrols “need not be justified by probable cause and may be undertaken if the stopping 
officer is ‘aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, 
that reasonably warrant suspicion’ that a vehicle contains illegal aliens” but prohibiting searches 
based simply on the vehicle’s “general vicinity” to the border (quoting United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975))); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) 
KIMEL IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2012  12:14 PM 
2013] DNA PROFILES & THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 943 
outcomes dependent upon an amorphous balancing test.60 Still, this 
much has been established: a “search” occurs, and some measure of 
Fourth Amendment protection is triggered, when “the government 
violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 
reasonable.”61 Once a Fourth Amendment search has occurred, the 
only question is what degree of protection the Fourth Amendment 
will afford.62 
III.  ARE CODIS SEARCHES FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES? 
Naturally, then, the first question to arise in this Note’s inquiry 
into constitutionality of CODIS searches is whether such searches are 
in fact “searches” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. To 
determine whether CODIS searches are independent Fourth 
Amendment searches, it is necessary to ask, first, whether those 
subject to the searches have a “subjective expectation of privacy” in 
the DNA profiles that the government lawfully has created and, 
second, whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation of 
privacy as “reasonable.”63 This Part will address each question in turn, 
ultimately arguing that subjects’ continuing privacy interest in their 
genetic profiles is both actual and reasonable, and thus that the 
Fourth Amendment is implicated in every CODIS search. 
A. Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
CODIS searches meet the first prong of the Fourth Amendment 
test because CODIS subjects’ actual expectation of privacy in their 
biological relationships and physical whereabouts persists even after 
the government has seized their DNA. First, the large volume and 
personal nature of the information in DNA gives rise to privacy 
expectations that are broader and more durable than the expectations 
surrounding other types of physical evidence. Second, CODIS 
 
(holding that a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 60. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1978) (“The reasonableness of seizures that 
are less intrusive than a traditional arrest depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and 
the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’” 
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977))). 
 61. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
 62. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (rejecting “the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not 
come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something 
called a ‘technical arrest’ or a ‘full-blown search’”). 
 63. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. 
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subjects have discrete privacy expectations in their genetic 
relationship with each person to whom their profile is compared and 
in their physical presence in each place where a forensic sample is 
found. Third and finally, under current jurisprudence, the 
government’s continuous CODIS searches undermine CODIS 
subjects’ subjective privacy interests in a profound and fundamental 
way. 
Proponents of DNA-collection statutes contend that any 
invasion of subjects’ privacy is complete upon the initial tissue 
extraction and the generation of the genetic profile, and that 
subsequent profile searches reexamine previously acquired 
information but reveal no “new, private or intimate information” and 
therefore create no new Fourth Amendment issue.64 Because a 
“defendant could not possibly assert any expectation of privacy with 
respect to the scientific analysis of a lawfully seized item of tangible 
property, such as a gun,” proponents argue, DNA likewise 
legitimately is “subject to a battery of scientific tests” once it is 
lawfully in the government’s possession.65 
This argument, however, overlooks the extreme qualitative 
difference between DNA and an “item of tangible property, such as a 
gun.” Unlike an item of tangible property, DNA contains inherently 
personal information about an individual. Whereas a scientific 
analysis of a gun reveals only the properties of an inanimate and not 
particularly personal object, the significance of which is limited to the 
investigation at hand, the administration of “a battery of scientific 
tests” upon a person’s DNA has the capacity to reveal the unique 
manner in which that person constitutes and regulates every aspect of 
her being.66 The strict confidentiality attending the results of private 
genetic testing illuminates this intuitive understanding of privacy 
expectations in genetic information and contrasts strongly with 
 
 64. Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir. 2010); see also State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 
14142 (Haw. 2003) (“[The defendant’s] privacy interest in his blood and hair terminated at the 
time the sample was obtained pursuant to a lawful search and seizure.”); People v. King, 663 
N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (App. Div. 1997) (“Privacy concerns are no longer relevant once the sample 
has already lawfully been removed from the body . . . .”); Kaye, supra note 4, at 45 (“Once the 
government lawfully acquires the [genetic] information, the marginal invasion of privacy that 
comes from using it later is minimal.”). Even commentators who challenge the constitutionality 
of DNA-collection statutes tend to focus their attack on the initial extraction of genetic 
information rather than on subsequent database searches, or they simply assume that later 
database searches do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Joh, supra note 4, at 875. 
 65. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 614. 
 66. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
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expectations regarding the results of a scientific manipulation of an 
ordinary item of property.67 Finally, the prospect of the state’s 
“battery” of tests is all the more threatening when one considers that 
the only limit that many DNA-collection statutes impose upon the 
state’s use of biological samples is the vague restriction that the 
samples be used in fulfillment of “law enforcement purposes.”68 
Moreover, each attempt to match two genetic profiles does in 
fact reveal novel private information, in at least two ways. First, 
genetic matching uncovers what biological relationship exists between 
the persons whom the profiles identify.69 Although one’s genetic 
profile may be forever established in the initial profiling, genetic 
relationships are newly explored with each potential match, whether 
the government seeks a complete match or the more controversial 
partial match.70 Therefore, because each profile comparison reveals 
new, otherwise-private information about the biological relationship 
between the profiles’ subjects, subjective privacy expectations arise 
anew with each genetic comparison. 
Importantly, these privacy expectations assert themselves 
regardless of the expected outcome of the genetic comparisons; it is 
 
 67. For example, it is the position of the World Health Organization that “[i]f anything, the 
confidentiality of genetic information may need to be guarded even more stringently 
than . . . ordinary [medical information].” Genetic Testing, GENOMIC RES. CTR., WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/genomics/elsi/gentesting/en (last visited Nov. 20, 2012); see 
also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (holding that a hospital program that 
informed police of pregnant patients who tested positive for cocaine use violated the Fourth 
Amendment, and viewing as important that “[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by 
the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will 
not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent”). 
 68. Suter, supra note 5, at 33536. For example, in writing about familial database searches, 
Professor Murphy worries that the disproportionately African-American and Hispanic CODIS 
population risks “open[ing] the door to a kind of twenty-first century racial eugenics in which 
crime and criminology are viewed largely as functions of genetics and biology.” Murphy, supra 
note 49, at 32125. 
 69. The concept that comparison can work a Fourth Amendment harm, even when one of 
the objects being compared is lawfully in the government’s possession, is not new to the federal 
courts. See United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that a 
Fourth Amendment search occurred when police inserted a key, lawfully in the state’s 
possession, into a lock, without opening the door, in order to determine ownership of the key); 
United States v. Portillo-Reyes, 529 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1975) (same). But see United States 
v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that no Fourth Amendment search occurred 
under a similar fact pattern); United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(same); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987) (holding that an officer’s copying down of a 
stereo’s serial number to compare to a stolen stereo’s serial number was not a Fourth 
Amendment search). 
 70. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
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not the case that people with “nothing to hide” are unalarmed by 
comparisons of their genetic material with someone else’s.71 Indeed, if 
people were concerned for their genetic privacy only when they 
believed that their genetic information was in some way inculpatory, 
then a man would not mind undergoing paternity testing not just for 
his (purported) children, but for the whole neighborhood. Similarly, a 
woman would not mind undergoing genetic screening not just with 
her spouse, but with all the men in town. The reality is that although 
genetic information is in itself intensely personal, comparisons 
between a person’s own genetic makeup and someone else’s acquire 
an additional layer of intimacy. In the same way that one’s privacy is 
not less invaded because the paternity tests disclose that one is not a 
neighbor’s parent, it is immaterial to the Fourth Amendment that 
CODIS searches most often reveal that two profiles are “not a 
match.”72 The Fourth Amendment “does not protect information per 
se,” but instead “protects individuals against oppressive methods for 
acquiring that information.”73 It matters not that the majority of 
CODIS searches do not return a hit because the method of searching 
subjects’ genetic profiles within a database for a match is “arbitrary 
and oppressive.”74 
 
 71. This Note’s argument is thus distinct from the straw man that proponents of DNA-
collection statutes argue against, namely, that the Fourth Amendment should protect criminals’ 
privacy interest in not being identified as the perpetrator of their crimes. See, e.g., Kaye, supra 
note 4, at 4647 (“[S]urely retrawls could reveal things a person would rather keep private. For 
example, an individual whose DNA profile is in the database . . . might well be concerned that 
later trawls will expose him as the perpetrator of an unsolved crime.”). Justice Scalia offered a 
more ingenious articulation of the interplay between privacy and criminality, writing for the 
majority in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987): “there is nothing new in the realization that 
the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of 
us all,” id. at 329. 
 72. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362 (1998) (“[A] Fourth 
Amendment violation is ‘fully accomplished’ by the illegal search . . . .” (quoting United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1987))); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325 (finding in the context of a search that 
consisted of moving a turntable a couple of inches that “[i]t matters not that the search 
uncovered nothing of any great personal value to respondent—serial numbers rather than (what 
might conceivably have been hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs,” 
because “[a] search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a 
turntable”); cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the home . . . all details are 
intimate details . . . .”). 
 73. Kaye, supra note 4, at 47. 
 74. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (“The Fourth 
Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and 
oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of 
individuals.”). 
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The second way in which CODIS searches expose information 
that would otherwise remain private is by divulging subjects’ presence 
in noncriminal but embarrassing places. Wherever we go, we leave a 
trail of DNA behind us in the form of skin, saliva, hair, or blood.75 
Because modern DNA analysis requires only a tiny volume of tissue 
to generate a genetic profile, one leaves more than enough DNA 
behind to betray her presence in a space when she discards a spent 
cigarette or leaves her cup on the table after dining in a restaurant.76 
When the person shedding the DNA is a CODIS subject, then, the 
government can deduce her movements by collecting, profiling, and 
matching the DNA she continually leaves in her wake. The danger 
here is that CODIS subjects who were present in a place where a 
crime was committed—but at a time other than during its 
commission—would have their private movements exposed to 
scrutiny despite the lack of any independent connection between the 
CODIS subject and the crime. 
Again, CODIS searches offend subjective expectations of 
privacy even in the absence of crime. After all, concern for privacy in 
one’s physical movements is “not . . . solely the lot of the guilty. To be 
law abiding is not necessarily to be spotless,” and “[u]nwanted 
attention from the local police need not be less discomforting simply 
because one’s secrets are not the stuff of criminal prosecutions.”77 The 
government’s practice of comparing all profiles within CODIS with 
every crime-scene sample that they generate has the capacity to 
reveal such intimate, noncriminal information as a CODIS subject’s 
extramarital affair, the identity of her sexual partners, or her presence 
in a sex shop, strip club, or any number of other places rendered 
embarrassing by individual circumstance. CODIS searches’ capacity 
to reveal personal, noncriminal activity in addition to criminal activity 
distinguishes the database searches from police practices that do not 
rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment search, such as canine sniffs 
that reveal only hidden contraband or blood tests that reveal only the 
presence of drugs in the suspect’s system.78 
 
 75. Joh, supra note 4, at 858. 
 76. Jaxon Van Derbeken, How Alleged Serial Killer Fell into Trap, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21, 
2003, at A1. A DNA profile can be constructed from a microscopic six-cell biological sample. 
Murphy, supra note 26, at 733. 
 77. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 465 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted). 
 78. Compare Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 40910 (2005) (stating that one of the 
critical factors rendering police use of a heat-sensing device unconstitutional in Kyllo v. United 
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Further, subjective privacy expectations are not extinguished by 
the subject’s awareness that the government possesses his genetic 
profile. As a formal matter, courts repeatedly have held that one need 
not exclude others absolutely in order to maintain an expectation of 
privacy over a place or thing.79 Given this framework, it makes sense 
to relax the exclusion requirement in the context of DNA because 
DNA is by its nature nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, yet highly 
personal.80 In addition, practically speaking, if a person knows of no 
reason why she should be suspected of wrongdoing, she also expects 
that intimate aspects of her life—including her DNA—are free from 
state scrutiny. Therefore, just because a person knows that the police 
generated her DNA profile as a result of a prior conviction does not 
mean that that person expects her profile to be searched continually, 
for years, for unrelated crimes that she is not suspected of 
committing. Indeed, for evidence that individuals maintain an 
expectation of genetic privacy in the face of knowledge that police 
legitimately possess their DNA profile, one need look no further than 
the lawsuits brought by individuals who voluntarily gave DNA 
samples to assist with a specific investigation, only to find that the 
state retained their samples after the investigation ended and added 
their profiles to the government’s files.81 
 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), was that “the device was capable of detecting lawful activity”), with 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (finding that “[a] ‘canine sniff’ by a well-trained 
narcotics detection dog” is not a Fourth Amendment search in part because “[i]t does not 
expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view”), and 
Porter v. State, 93 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (“[A] government investigative 
technique, such as a dog sniff or chemical test, that discloses only the presence or absence of 
narcotics, and does not expose noncontraband items, activity, or information that would 
otherwise remain hidden from public view, does not intrude on a legitimate expectation of 
privacy and is thus not a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Sara M. Smyth, Searches of Computers and Computer Data at the United States 
Border: The Need for a New Framework Following United States v. Arnold, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 69, 97 (“The mere act of accessing a network does not, in itself, extinguish 
privacy expectations, nor does the fact that others may have occasional access to the 
computer.”); cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (finding a subjective expectation 
of privacy in a closed public telephone booth made of glass). 
 80. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]e can’t go anywhere or do much of anything without leaving a bread-crumb 
trail of identifying DNA matter.”). 
 81. See, e.g., John R. Ellement, Keeping DNA Samples Limited, Court Rules, BOS. GLOBE 
(Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/08/26/keeping_ 
dna_samples_limited_court_rules (recounting a six-year legal battle to recover a voluntary 
subject’s DNA sample and profile). 
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Finally, for subjects who are aware of the government’s 
continuous use of their genetic profile in CODIS, the government’s 
database searches also injure subjective privacy expectations in a 
more latent, pervasive sense. The source of this pernicious harm is the 
fact that sustained suspicionless searches of DNA databases are “both 
visible (in that the subjects know they might be watched) and 
unverifiable (in that they do not know when they are being 
watched).”82 Database searches are conducted en masse and without 
individualized suspicion, and subjects therefore cannot predict in 
what context their genetic code, and thereby their movements and 
relationships, will come under the government microscope. In this 
way, DNA-database searches can intrude upon subjects’ “negative 
freedom,” or their “freedom of not being interfered with.”83 The 
unpredictability of the searches can rob subjects of their generalized 
sense of privacy and compel them in all situations “to plan [their] 
actions while taking into account the public that has been forced on 
[them] and that judges those actions.”84 
The Supreme Court has recognized that negative freedom is an 
important aspect of citizens’ privacy interests. For example, in 
Lawrence v. Texas,85 the Court found that the preservation of negative 
freedom—or, as the Court called it, “transcendent” freedom—is 
fundamental to the sustenance of other aspects of liberty because 
“[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self” and “spheres of our lives 
and existence . . . where the State [is not] a dominant presence.”86 
Additionally, in New York v. Ferber,87 the Court found indeterminate 
 
 82. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1385 (emphasis omitted). 
 83. Id. at 1386 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON 
LIBERTY 118, 12223 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he right to be let alone [is] the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”), overruled by Katz, 389 
U.S. 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 84. Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism—Protection of Human 
Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest—The Proper Balance, 37 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 27, 32 (2004). Some evidence suggests that people experience continuous or 
unfocused searches as more invasive than targeted searches related to specific investigations. 
See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 317, 335 (2008) (documenting the results of an empirical study on perceptions of 
intrusiveness). 
 85. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 86. Id. at 562; see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The security of one’s 
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment—is basic to a free society.”). 
 87. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
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surveillance of noncriminal acts to be a serious invasion of privacy 
interests.88 Specifically, the Ferber Court found that child 
pornography injures the subject child’s “interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters” because the child “must go through 
life knowing that the recording [of her sexual act] is circulating,” 
constantly “fear[ing] . . . exposure.”89 The child does not fear exposure 
as a criminal; the child is not a criminal. Rather, the child fears the 
deep humiliation that would attend the revelation of an intimate 
aspect of her person in a context that she cannot control—a 
personhood concern not wholly divorced from the privacy interest 
implicated in the content and physical presence of one’s DNA.90 
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
CODIS searches meet the second prong of the test for a Fourth 
Amendment search because CODIS subjects’ persistent expectations 
of privacy in their genetic relationships and physical movements are 
reasonable. First, society finds its own privacy expectations in these 
matters reasonable, and there is no constitutionally permissible 
reason to treat CODIS subjects’ expectations any differently. Second, 
DNA’s form and content distinguish DNA from evidence that is 
guarded by less robust privacy interests and align it instead with 
computer evidence, which the Fourth Amendment strongly protects. 
Generally, Americans oppose the imposition of a national DNA 
database with universal coverage.91 In defending the existing DNA-
 
 88. See id. at 774 (holding that the right to free speech does not forbid states from banning 
the sale of material depicting children engaged in sexual activity). 
 89. Id. at 759 n.10 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); David P. Shouvlin, 
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 
(1981); and Ulrich C. Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J. AM. 
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 289, 292 (1980)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 90. See id. (“[I]t is the fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the act secret that seem 
to have the most profound emotional repercussions.” (citation omitted)). 
 91. Cf., e.g., Simon A. Cole, Fingerprint Identification and the Criminal Justice System: 
Historical Lessons for the DNA Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE 
TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 63, 82 (David Lazer ed., 2004) (“Given the widespread popular view 
of DNA as ‘genetic blueprint’ and distrust of government, . . . politicians will be reluctant to 
support a universal genetic database. Thus, DNA databases can be expected to include 
everyone designated ‘criminal’ but not ‘law-abiding’ citizens.”); Peter Neufeld, Panel Discussion 
at the Conference on DNA and the Criminal Justice System at Harvard University (Nov. 21, 
2000) (transcript available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/dna/transcribe_table_page.htm) 
(“[F]rankly . . . most people in the country are not in favor of the universal databank for a 
variety of reasons.”). Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612 (Cal. 2011), is 
illustrative of Americans’ overweening concern with privacy in their personal-identification 
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collection database, the government often finds it necessary to 
disavow the possibility of a universal database,92 and police oppose 
their own inclusion in CODIS.93 So, intuitively, it also should be true 
that society finds its own expectation of genetic privacy “reasonable,” 
even its expectation of privacy in DNA profiles constructed from 
noncoding loci. Society believes that its privacy expectations are 
“reasonable” even though most people presumably do not plan to 
embark upon a crime spree. 
But even if subjects’ privacy interests are implicated by 
continuous database searches, defenders of the CODIS searches’ 
constitutionality contend, the classes of people to whom DNA-
collection statutes apply have a reduced expectation of privacy that 
database searches do not violate.94 In other words, because the 
majority of those whose genetic profiles inhabit CODIS are present 
or former criminal convicts,95 society is not prepared to recognize 
their genetic privacy interests as “reasonable,” at least as far as their 
DNA profiles are concerned. Yet the Supreme Court has “repeatedly 
held” that prisoners do not forfeit their constitutional rights at the 
prison door, with the sole exception of rights that are “fundamentally 
inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the 
objectives of incarceration.”96 Thus, in Hudson v. Palmer,97 the 
Supreme Court found that a prisoner does not have a reasonable 
 
information. In that case, a Williams-Sonoma customer brought a winning lawsuit to stop 
retailers from querying customers for their zip codes. Id. at 620. 
 92. See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 143 (Haw. 2003) (“[T]he prosecution contends 
that [the defense’s] concern that ‘[l]aw enforcement could gather a DNA databank of its 
citizens . . . appears to be an overstatement.’” (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting 
the defense) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 93. See Dave Collins, Police Wary of Giving DNA Samples, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 16, 
2001, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/police-dna-samples_n_1015541. 
html (“Rank-and-file police from Connecticut to Chicago to Los Angeles have opposed what 
some experts say is a slowly emerging trend in the U.S. to collect officers’ DNA. ‘From a civil 
liberties standpoint, there are a lot of red flags,’ said Connecticut Trooper Steven Rief, former 
president of the state police union.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) 
(“[Prisoners’] privacy interests are extinguished by the judgments placing them in custody.”). 
 95. Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Approach: A Viewpoint on the Study of the Legal, 
Ethical and Policy Considerations Raised by DNA Tests and Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
214, 216 (2006). 
 96. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984); see also Kaye & Smith, supra note 4, at 418 
(“The state could hardly provide that a citizen convicted of even the most heinous crime 
thereby forfeits the right to free speech, the privilege against self-incrimination, or the plethora 
of other rights secured by the Constitution.”). 
 97. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). 
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expectation of privacy in his prison cell because such an expectation 
“simply cannot be reconciled with . . . the needs and objectives of 
penal institutions,”98 including the need to protect inmates, staff, and 
visitors from weapons that an inmate could conceal there.99 
Griffin v. Wisconsin100 is perhaps even more relevant to the issue 
of searching subjects’ genetic profiles within a database because it 
involves the reasonable privacy expectations of individuals who have 
been convicted of a crime but who are not physically incarcerated.101 
In Griffin, a warrantless “special needs” search of a probationer’s 
home was found constitutional, even though the search was justified 
by less than probable cause.102 In deeming the search “reasonable” 
despite the lowered level of individualized suspicion, the Court held 
that probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy because their 
continued physical liberty depends upon their supervised compliance 
with conditions not applicable to generalized society.103 This 
heightened supervision is in turn justified because “‘the very 
assumption of the institution of probation’ is that the probationer ‘is 
more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.’”104 Because 
police must confirm probationers’ adherence to probation restrictions 
even within the probationers’ own homes, probationers enjoy only a 
reduced expectation of privacy inside their homes.105 
In Hudson and Griffin, the Court recognized that convicts’ 
reasonable expectations of privacy are reduced to the extent 
necessary for the imposition of the prescribed punishment as a 
practical matter. Yet neither Hudson nor Griffin held that convicts 
lose reasonable privacy expectations simply by virtue of being 
convicts. Indeed, the Court in Hudson was explicit that citizens do not 
lose their constitutional rights upon conviction of a crime.106 
 
 98. Id. at 526. 
 99. Id. at 52627. 
 100. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
 101. Id. at 87072. 
 102. Id. at 872. 
 103. Id. at 87475; see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (“Inherent in 
the very nature of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which 
every citizen is entitled.’” (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874)); Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 
524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998) (“Parole is a ‘variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals.’” 
(quoting Morrissey v. Breyer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972))). 
 104. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880). 
 105. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (defining and discussing the goals of probation). 
 106. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (“[W]e have insisted that prisoners be 
accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment.”); see also Wolff v. 
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Under Hudson and Griffin, it is unclear from whence might stem 
the reduced privacy expectations of convicts subject to DNA-
collection statutes. Unlike the searches at issue in those cases, 
searching the DNA profiles in CODIS cannot be necessary to enforce 
the punishments meted out to these convicts, as searching for 
evidence of a second crime clearly is unrelated to imposition of 
punishment for the crime for which the individual already has been 
convicted.107 Furthermore, in stark contrast to probationers, once a 
DNA-database subject has paid her debt to society for a crime for 
which she has been convicted, the justice system positively is 
forbidden to “assum[e]” that she is “more likely than the ordinary 
citizen to violate the law.”108 Rather, if the former convict is ever again 
suspected of criminal activity, she will enjoy the benefit of “the 
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary,” which “lies at the 
foundation of the administration of our criminal law,” that “there is a 
presumption of innocence” in her favor.109 Finally, added to these 
essential problems is a temporal one. Prisoners complete their jail 
terms and probation periods end, and those individuals will regain 
normal privacy expectations—but the government retains and 
searches DNA profiles into perpetuity.110 
Ultimately, one might concede that CODIS subjects have a 
continuing reasonable expectation of privacy in their DNA profiles 
but nevertheless argue that society simply would feel better knowing 
that former convicts were forever subject to genetic surveillance. 
However, this wish cannot overcome the Fourth Amendment’s 
 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 55556 (1974) (“There is no iron curtain drawn between the 
Constitution and the prisons of this country.”). 
 107. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 8182 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Clearly, the cases in which the 
Supreme Court has concluded that prisoners forfeit their Fourth Amendment rights upon 
incarceration deal with searches . . . for reasons of safety and orderly administration of prison 
facilities, concerns not implicated [by DNA-collection statutes].”). 
 108. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 109. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
 110. See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a felon who 
has completed probation does not have a right to purge his DNA sample even though he has 
completed his sentence). Thus, CODIS searches persist for longer than the law justifies other, 
more formalized methods of supervision. Cf. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1375 (“[T]he right story 
to tell about technological surveillance and control is not one of streamlining or one-for-one 
substitution, but rather one of proliferation, expansion, and enhancement. . . . [F]ocused on the 
strictures that govern what appears to be a more restrictive physical alternative, courts neglect 
to ask whether the more restrictive option would apply or, even if it did, whether any distinct 
burdens of the technological restraint demand some special procedural due process.”). 
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protection of CODIS subjects any more than hospital administrators’ 
desire to foster newborn health can supersede the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of new mothers who use crack cocaine.111 
Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, laudable—or, at 
least, understandable—public policy goals do not supersede 
constitutional protection of individuals’ privacy expectations.112 And 
although historically a finding that a person is “dangerous” 
sometimes has been sufficient to warrant her incapacitation even in 
the absence of crime, such restraints generally are imposed only after 
painstaking individualized determinations113 or when imposed in an 
extremely targeted fashion.114 
A further argument against the reasonableness of subjects’ 
continued expectation of privacy in their DNA profiles is that society 
does not “recognize an expectation of privacy in records made for 
 
 111. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001) (“[The respondents’] motive was 
benign rather than punitive. Such a motive, however, cannot justify a departure from Fourth 
Amendment protections . . . .”); see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 459 
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[C]onsensus that a particular law enforcement technique 
serves a laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis.”); Brown v. 
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“The record suggests an understandable desire to assert a police 
presence [in the drug-ridden neighborhood]; however, that purpose does not negate Fourth 
Amendment guarantees.”). 
 112. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52; see also Jason Tarricone, Note, “An Ordinary Citizen Just Like 
Everyone Else”: The Indefinite Retention of Former Offenders’ DNA, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
209, 239 (2005) (noting that by the same logic used to justify indefinite, continuous searches of 
genetic profiles without individualized suspicion, “we could probably prevent most rapes (of 
women) . . . if we kept all men ages twelve to sixty-five interned in the desert, away from women 
and children”). 
 113. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (holding that nonpunitive civil 
commitment imposed after a prison term is constitutional because the applicable statute 
requires individualized findings of mental abnormality or personality disorder in addition to 
findings of dangerousness); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279 (1984) (finding that family-court 
judges may predict a juvenile’s future dangerousness based on “a host of variables,” including 
the effectiveness of the juvenile’s supervision at home, the juvenile’s situation at school, and 
“any special circumstances that might be brought to [the judge’s] attention by the probation 
officer, the child’s attorney, or any parents, relatives, or other responsible persons 
accompanying the child”); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 27576 (1976) (holding that the 
statutory requirement that a prediction of the defendant’s future dangerousness be considered 
in the jury’s determination to impose the death penalty is constitutionally permissible because 
“the jury ha[s] before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose 
fate it must determine”). But see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (explaining that the state 
may make “reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail 
particular regulatory consequences,” provided, however, that more debilitating constraints are 
implemented only upon individualized findings). 
 114. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980) (“Congress’ judgment that a 
convicted felon . . . is among the class of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or 
possessing firearms because of potential dangerousness is rational.”). 
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public purposes.”115 Some courts and commentators refer to this as the 
true-identity exception to Fourth Amendment protections.116 The 
argument is that “DNA results are like fingerprints which are 
maintained on file by law enforcement authorities for use in further 
investigations.”117 Because police may reference existing fingerprint 
records in the FBI’s national fingerprint database without implicating 
the Fourth Amendment, they, the argument goes, should also search 
the DNA database free of constitutional restraint.118 
This argument is important because it has the potential to shift 
the debate toward either of two exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements. If DNA 
databases have a record-keeping purpose, then arguably the process 
of extracting the samples, profiling them, and compiling the DNA 
database could be considered either an administrative search119 or a 
special-needs search.120 The question of whether the initial gathering 
of DNA samples constitutes an administrative or special-needs search 
is beyond the scope of this Note, which instead addresses CODIS 
searches occurring after the database has been assembled. Because 
these searches indisputably have an investigative purpose, they are 
ineligible for either exception.121 The fingerprints-on-file analogy is 
 
 115. Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001). 
 116. Kaye & Smith, supra note 4, at 430. 
 117. Bickley v. State, 489 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting the trial court) 
(internal quotation mark omitted); see also Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“[The purpose of the Wisconsin DNA law] is to obtain reliable proof of a felon’s identity.”). 
 118. See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting petitioner’s claim 
that the “Fourth Amendment applies to each ‘search’ of the [DNA] database”). Some courts 
even have suggested that subjects should thank their lucky stars for DNA surveillance because 
the only difference between fingerprinting and DNA profiling is that DNA is more accurate, 
and “the more accurate the identification method the less intrusive it is because of the 
associated reduced risk that the sample will result in misidentification.” See United States v. 
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2007). Of course, misidentification is not the privacy concern 
that CODIS searches present—rather, one of DNA matching’s real privacy intrusions is its 
capacity definitively to identify a CODIS subject as having been present at a noncriminal, but 
embarrassing, situation. 
 119. Administrative searches must have a “subsidiary purpose” distinct from criminal-law 
purposes, but neither a concurrent criminal-law purpose nor the discovery of evidence of a 
crime in the course of an administrative search strips it of its administrative-exception status. 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712, 716 (1987). 
 120. Special-needs searches’ “primary purpose” is something other than “uncover[ing] 
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 4142 
(2000). For an examination of whether DNA-collection statutes authorize administrative or 
special-needs searches, see generally Maclin, supra note 3. 
 121. See supra notes 119–120. 
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relevant to whether a search of an existing database is a discrete 
Fourth Amendment search, however, and so a brief review of the 
issue is appropriate. 
The principal argument against the DNA-as-fingerprint analogy 
mirrors this Note’s first argument against the DNA-as-tangible-
property analogy:122 there is a gargantuan qualitative difference 
between DNA and fingerprints. Fingerprints are capable only of 
identifying their subjects.123 In contrast, DNA has the capacity to 
identify subjects and to provide deeply personal information about 
biological relationships, behavioral predispositions, and disease 
states.124 As Professor Elizabeth Joh has written, DNA is different 
because “[f]ingerprints do not promise [the] potential for yielding 
vast amounts of genetic information for government use, forever.”125 
In this regard, and given the risk of governmental abuse of valuable 
personal information and the political vulnerability of the groups 
subject to DNA-collection statutes, it is small consolation that DNA-
databasing statutes contain only a few meager safeguards against the 
government’s misuse of information.126 
The nature and form of DNA further bolsters one’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the information contained in her genetic 
material, as opposed to on the surface of her fingertips. A person’s 
DNA is hidden inside her body’s tissue, encrypted in a code that 
scientists only comparatively recently began to crack.127 Indeed, a 
person’s genetic identity is so subtly expressed that one cannot know 
 
 122. See supra notes 66–68. 
 123. Joh, supra note 4, at 870. 
 124. Id. at 870–71. 
 125. Id. at 871. 
 126. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (“Power is a heady thing; and 
history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.”); United States v. Kincade, 
379 F.3d 813, 843 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Even governments with 
benign intentions have proven unable to regulate or use wisely vast stores of information they 
collect regarding their citizens.”); SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 32–33 (1989) 
(explaining that “[t]he consequences of testing HIV-positive are even more punitive for those 
selected populations—there will be more—upon which the government has already made 
testing mandatory” and that these punitive consequences include the removal of personnel who 
test HIV-positive from “sensitive” military positions). The most basic safeguard built into the 
DNA-databasing process is that a subject’s genetic profile includes only non coding loci. See 
supra note 18. The federal DNA-databasing statute and many state statutes also make it a crime 
to misuse a biological sample or DNA profile. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c) (2006); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 299.5(i)(1)(a) (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). 
 127. See International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, supra note 6 
(announcing that the Human Genome Project, an international effort to sequence the human 
DNA code, was completed in 2003). 
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the contents of her own DNA profile without the benefit of scientific 
testing. Obviously, then, the embedded, encrypted nature of a 
person’s DNA differs dramatically from the familiar swirls that are 
visible on that same person’s fingertips. 
But perhaps a less obvious comparison is to encrypted 
information stored inside a computer. In the context of computers, 
courts have found that encryption and password protection create a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information thus encrypted 
or protected.128 And although, unlike computer encryption, genetic 
coding is biological rather than volitional, that difference does not 
affect the expectation of privacy to which the coding gives rise. That 
scientists can decode the genome also does not defeat one’s code-
inspired expectation of privacy—after all, the government’s computer 
scientists likewise can best most computer encryptions and 
passwords.129 
IV.  ARE CODIS SEARCHES “REASONABLE?” WARRANT AND 
INDIVIDUALIZED-SUSPICION REQUIREMENTS 
Thus far, this Note has argued that each time law enforcement 
officers search a genetic profile in CODIS, they disrupt database 
subjects’ subjective, reasonable expectation of privacy in her genetic 
information. Therefore, given that the Fourth Amendment is 
implicated afresh with each attempt to match a database subject’s 
DNA profile with another DNA profile, the next issue to resolve is in 
what way the Fourth Amendment should guard subjects’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy. The touchstone for this inquiry again is 
“reasonableness”; here, however, the Fourth Amendment is 
concerned with the reasonableness of the search—as opposed to the 
reasonableness of the subjects’ privacy expectations.130 
As has been mentioned, in crafting the standard of 
reasonableness that should apply to CODIS search procedures, there 
 
 128. Smyth, supra note 79, at 98; see also, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 554 
(4th Cir. 2007) (finding that password protection places the password-protected files within a 
“locked box” for Fourth Amendment purposes (quoting United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 
539 (4th Cir. 1978))). 
 129. See The Year in Review, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Dec. 29, 2011), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/december/the-year-in-review-part-2/the-year-in-review-
part-2 (collecting the FBI’s 2011 cyber “takedowns”). 
 130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (“[T]he central inquiry under the Fourth 
Amendment . . . [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental 
invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”). 
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is a diverse palette of options from which to choose.131 In particular, 
much scholarly ink has been spilt on the applicability of the special-
needs exception to the warrant and probable-cause requirements.132 In 
these discussions, however, scholars have tended to focus their Fourth 
Amendment inquiries on the initial seizure of the tissue sample, 
ignoring or rejecting Fourth Amendment harms caused by the 
profile’s later use.133 
As a result of this focus, scholars almost entirely have neglected 
to consider the similarities between DNA evidence stored in 
government databases and computer evidence stored in government 
copies of hard drives lawfully seized by police.134 Yet the parallels in 
nature, content, and privacy expectations between information stored 
in computers and in DNA make application of the rules governing 
computer searches an attractive solution to the problem of protecting 
the genetic information networked into CODIS’s immense data-
storage system. This Part begins by identifying similarities between 
DNA and computer evidence. It goes on to outline the increased 
protections that courts afford computers, as opposed to DNA, after 
government seizure. Next, this Part demonstrates the 
unconstitutionality of current CODIS search procedures by way of 
analogy to unconstitutional computer searches by general warrant. 
Finally, it argues that courts could best vindicate genetic privacy 
interests by requiring a modified version of computer-search 
procedures for each CODIS search. 
 
 131. See supra notes 5460 and accompanying text. 
 132. See, e.g., Kaye & Smith, supra note 4, at 434 (arguing that arrestee-collection statutes 
meet the special-needs test); Maclin, supra note 3, at 118 (arguing that sampling arrestees’ DNA 
is not a valid special-needs search); Derek Regensburger, DNA Databases and the Fourth 
Amendment: The Time Has Come To Reexamine the Special Needs Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement and the Primary Purpose Test, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 319, 386 (2009) (arguing 
that arrestee DNA-collection statutes should be analyzed under the special-needs rubric); 
Tarricone, supra note 112, at 248 (arguing that the special-needs exception does not apply to the 
retention of “an ex-felon’s DNA sample and profile long after he has completed his sentence”). 
 133. See supra note 4. 
 134. For a notable exception, see Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When 
DNA Collected for One Purpose Is Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289 (2011), which 
compares the treatment of government-seized biological samples to the treatment of 
government-seized computers, id. at 1312–13. This Note is indebted to Ms. Lowenberg’s 
discussion of the similarities between computers and DNA. See id. at 1312 (“[B]oth [computers 
and DNA] store a large amount of intermingled information in a small space that cannot be 
parsed at the time of collection.”). 
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A. Similarities Between DNA and Computer Evidence 
DNA and computer evidence share at least three essential 
characteristics: both can have a near-dispositive effect on criminal 
investigations and prosecutions, both have an enormous storage 
capacity relative to their physical size, and both are repositories of 
intensely personal information. 
First, computer and DNA evidence both are considered so 
persuasive that “in many cases” in which the state prevails, they are 
“the sole proof of guilt that exists.”135 Computer evidence can be the 
principal or only evidence forming the basis of a conviction either 
when the defendant is charged with perpetrating a common-law crime 
on a computer—fraud is a good example—or when the alleged 
offense is inherently computer-based.136 Similarly, the existence of a 
genetic-profile match also can be outcome-determinative, as 
experience indicates that juries are willing to convict on the strength 
of DNA evidence alone,137 and common sense suggests that 
defendants are more likely to plead guilty when DNA evidence can 
be marshaled against them.138 
A second shared characteristic is the capacity to store an amount 
of information disproportionate to the physical size of the evidentiary 
medium.139 Courts concur that “[c]omputers record and store a 
remarkable amount of information about what users write, see, hear, 
 
 135. See Murphy, supra note 26, at 743 (writing with regard to DNA evidence). 
 136. See Online Privacy, Social Networking and Crime Victimization: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 5–7 (2010) (statement of Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation) (discussing types of cybercrime). For example, crimes amenable to proof solely or 
principally by computer evidence include child-pornography and intellectual-property offenses. 
See id. at 25 (statement of Joe Sullivan, Chief Security Officer, Facebook, Inc.) (discussing the 
need for broader information access to better discover evidence of child pornography on social-
networking websites); id. at 55 (statement of Joe Pasqua, Vice President for Research, 
Symantec, Inc.) (discussing the use of social-networking websites to obtain personal information 
on key corporate employees in an attempt to gain access to intellectual property). 
 137. Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough To Convict, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 114043 (2010); see also People v. Rush, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362, 363 (App. 
Div. 1998) (affirming a rape conviction when a DNA match implicated the defendant, although 
the only other evidence against him were photo and lineup identifications, and although the 
victim could not identify the defendant at trial). 
 138. See Roth, supra note 137, at 1143 n.55 (citing a defendant’s entry of a guilty plea when 
the only basis for indictment was DNA evidence). But cf. Murphy, supra note 26, at 742 (noting 
that formal statistics on cases relying solely on genetic evidence are hard to come by). 
 139. Lowenberg, supra note 134, at 1310. 
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and do.”140 For example, the average one-hundred gigabyte home 
computer stores the equivalent of fifty million typed pages,141 a 
veritable “library’s worth of information.”142 Much of this storage 
capacity is devoted to personal information such as bills and finance, 
medical information (actual medical records, as well as the 
computer’s memory of medical websites visited), personal 
correspondence, and records of other personal activities.143 DNA 
stores a similarly large quantity of information. The DNA in even one 
drop of human blood contains all three billion of the human genome’s 
nucleotide bases, all of which scientists have decoded.144 The 
substance of this genetic information is extremely personal for 
reasons this Note has discussed already: DNA contains the 
instructions for the proteins that form and regulate our bodies.145 
Third, and most problematic for Fourth Amendment purposes, 
both computers and DNA store information in a highly integrated 
manner, intermingling the data in such a way that any one item is 
difficult to extract from the system as a whole. In the case of 
computers, this means that files for which police have probable cause 
and a warrant to search, like records of drug sales, often are 
interspersed with unrelated personal files, like intimate emails.146 The 
documents that justified the search also may be intermingled with 
 
 140. Kerr, supra note 53, at 532; see also, e.g., United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 
(9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is true that computers can store a large amount of material . . . .”). 
 141. Kimberly Nakamaru, Note, Mining for Manny: Electronic Search and Seizure in the 
Aftermath of United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 771, 781 
(2011). 
 142. United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001). For the Tenth Circuit, this 
impressive capacity places computers beyond “the established categories of constitutional 
doctrine” and “[a]nalogies to other physical objects, such as dressers or file cabinets.” Id. 
 143. See Kerr, supra note 53, at 543 (noting that this information includes, for example, the 
user’s actions in frequently used programs, like word processors). Computers also record users’ 
visits to pornographic websites, a digital foray indulged in by roughly one-fifth of all Internet 
users. Anton L. Janik, Jr., Combating the Illicit Internet: Decisions by the Tenth Circuit To Apply 
Harsher Sentences and Lessened Search Requirements to Child Pornographers Using Computers, 
79 DENV. U. L. REV. 379, 379 (2001). 
 144. International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, supra note 6. 
 145. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Kerr, supra note 53, at 54347 (describing various methods by which a forensic 
examiner would seek to locate a particular file from among a computer’s documentary and 
programmatic entanglement). 
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files evidencing unrelated and previously unsuspected criminal 
activity.147 
The kind of information stored in DNA and the manner by 
which police access it create similar intermingling problems. In its 
descriptive capacity, DNA contains code that dictates tissue and 
organ development, but it also contains spans of nucleotide bases that 
only regulate (rather than create) bodily systems, as well as spans that 
appear not to code for anything at all.148 The trick of DNA profiling, 
then, is to separate the purely identifying information from the 
genetic-coding information. The DNA-profiling process at least 
nominally solves this aspect of the intermingling problem by singling 
out and memorializing the nucleotide bases at only the thirteen 
specified noncoding loci. 
However, a thornier intermingling problem arises with regard to 
DNA’s capacity to communicate information about subjects’ 
biological relationships and presence in physical spaces. The problem 
arises because the state first matches each forensic profile against all 
the other profiles in the state’s possession and then, if there is no hit, 
the FBI matches it against every one of CODIS’s over ten million 
offender profiles.149 In neither case does the government make any 
effort to limit its search to individuals who law enforcement might 
reasonably believe to be relevant to the investigation.150 The result is 
that police uncover an enormous amount of information about the 
genetic relationships between the source of the forensic sample and 
CODIS subjects, as well as information about CODIS subjects’ 
presence in the place where the forensic profile was found. But even 
under the best-case, complete-match scenario, only a tiny fraction of 
that information is relevant to the government’s investigation. Thus, 
just as computer data-storage systems intermingle information 
relevant to a criminal investigation with irrelevant personal 
information, so do police procedures for matching DNA profiles 
intermingle information relevant to their investigation—that is, 
 
 147. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 127071 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
police found child pornography while searching the suspect’s computer for evidence of drug 
sales). 
 148. See The New Genetics: Chapter 1: How Genes Work, NAT’L INST. OF GEN. MED. SCI., 
http://publications.nigms.nih.gov/thenewgenetics/chapter1.html#c1 (last updated June 9, 2011). 
 149. The FBI and DNA Part 1: A Look at the Nationwide System That Helps Solve Crimes, 
supra note 34. 
 150. Cf. id. (describing how a forensic profile is first compared to “all the offenders from [a] 
state’s database,” and then later may be compared to “all the 50 states’ offender profiles”). 
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profile matches wherein the CODIS subject is the perpetrator of the 
crime—with the irrelevant but personal information communicated 
by profile misses151 and by profile matches wherein the CODIS 
subject is not the perpetrator of the crime.152 
B. Differences in Current Treatment of Computer and DNA Searches 
Despite their similarities in form and content, computer evidence 
and genetic profiles generally have received very different treatment 
under Fourth Amendment law.153 Specifically, courts’ protection of 
privacy interests in information stored on personal computers even 
after police lawfully have seized the machines stands in marked 
contrast to courts’ denial of privacy interests in DNA profiles after 
individuals have been compelled to hand over a tissue sample. 
Because the procedures governing the initial seizure of 
computers and DNA influence courts’ subsequent treatment of the 
evidence, those procedures warrant a quick inspection here. 
Computer seizures must be authorized by a warrant and probable 
cause, per the basic Fourth Amendment standard.154 Thus, in the 
course of a warranted search, police generally may seize computers 
that they believe contain evidence specified in their warrant.155 Once a 
computer is in the government’s possession, police create a perfect, 
read-only copy of the hard drive, including a copy of all the 
computer’s files, programs, and metadata.156 The government then 
searches its copy of the computer for the evidence enumerated in its 
search warrant.157 In so searching, police are permitted to open every 
 
 151. For a discussion of privacy interests in information concerning biological relationships, 
see supra notes 6974 and accompanying text. 
 152. For a discussion of privacy interests in information concerning physical movements, see 
supra notes 7578 and accompanying text. 
 153. Some commentators have challenged this treatment. Noteworthy examples include 
Kelly Lowenberg, supra note 134, and Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth 
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 113 (2011). Josh Goldfoot is Senior Counsel of the 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the Department of Justice and argues that 
computer searches should be stripped of their Fourth Amendment protections and, inter alia, be 
treated similarly to blood analysis. Goldfoot, supra, at 112 & n *, 113, 150–51. 
 154. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 3 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/
ssmanual2009.pdf. 
 155. United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 156. Kerr, supra note 53, at 54041. 
 157. Id. at 540. Thus, like DNA searches, computer searches entail searching information 
that the government possesses “non-rivalrous[ly]” with the subject of the search. Id. at 560. 
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file on their copy of the computer, regardless of the file’s apparent 
irrelevance to their investigation,158 because “computer files can be 
disguised in any number of ingenious ways,” and computer “data 
might be erased,” “hidden,” or even “booby trap[ped].”159 However, 
courts restrict computer search targets to the documents and files 
specified in the search warrant.160 As a consequence, searches 
intended to uncover evidence of all or different crimes are strictly off-
limits.161 
This restriction on computer-search targets has several important 
implications. First, even when a search warrant is based on a 
reasonable belief that a computer-centered crime, like possession of 
child pornography, has been committed, the warrant violates the 
Fourth Amendment by “provid[ing] the government with 
unrestrained access to electronic records of [the suspect’s] daily 
activities and private affairs”162 if it does not list the evidence for 
which the police plan to search the computer.163 Instead of looking 
only for child pornography, courts fear, police “might review expense 
reports, income-related files and correspondence, and federal filing 
information in search of evidence of tax evasion,” or “[o]fficers might 
read through e-mail correspondence in search of evidence of an 
internet-based phishing scheme.”164 Courts recognize that evidence of 
unsuspected crimes could well be found on the government’s copy of 
a suspect’s hard drive—and if the case law is any indication, child 
pornography often is found unexpectedly—but courts nonetheless 
have determined that a suspect’s privacy interest in expense reports 
 
 158. See Manno v. Christie, No. 08-3254, 2008 WL 4058016, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2008) 
(noting that because an agent would have been authorized to briefly review all paper documents 
to determine their relevance to the warrant, it was similarly reasonable for an agent to open all 
computer files in search of relevant information); cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 
n.11 (1976) (“[I]t is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, 
in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.”). 
 159. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam). 
 160. See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, supra note 154, at 90–91 (“If 
the agent comes across evidence of a crime that is not identified by the warrant, it may be safe 
practice to obtain a second warrant.”). 
 161. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 78283 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 162. United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 163. Id. at 62. 
 164. Id. at 61. 
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and emails outweighs the social value of prosecuting other 
discovered, but previously unsuspected, crimes.165 
Second, courts’ belief that warrants provide essential protection 
for digital information has influenced their development of additional 
procedural requirements for computer searches. For example, one 
court has eliminated the plain-view exception to the warrant 
requirement in the computer search context.166 Additionally, some 
courts require government agents searching a computer to obtain a 
second warrant when, in the course of their original warranted search, 
they inadvertently come across evidence of a second crime.167 Indeed, 
to “abandon” the first search to pursue evidence of the second crime 
is to violate the Fourth Amendment, and if the state falls prey to this 
temptation, it loses the right to use the evidence of the second crime 
in criminal proceedings.168 
 
 165. See, e.g., United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d 470, 474–75 (8th Cir. 2010) (rejecting evidence 
of child pornography found by police in the course of a computer search for evidence of an 
illegal gambling operation); United States v. Highbarger, 380 Fed. App’x 127, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(rejecting evidence of child pornography that police discovered while searching a computer for 
evidence of illegal drug dealing); Mann, 592 F.3d at 780–81, 786 (stating that a detective found 
child pornography while searching the defendant’s computer for evidence of an unrelated crime 
and noting that “[a]lthough we now hold that [the detective’s] actions were within the scope of 
the warrant, we emphasize that his failure to stop his search and request a separate warrant for 
child pornography is troubling”); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(suppressing evidence of child pornography because the officer’s computer search exceeded the 
scope of the warrant). 
 166. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (repudiating the plain-view doctrine because it turns “all 
warrants for digital data into general warrants”). 
 167. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276; see also United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 
2005) (stating that officers should hold irrelevant computer files until the new conditions and 
limitations of the search are established); People v. Carratu, 755 N.Y.S.2d 800, 80709 (Sup. Ct. 
2003) (relying on United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999), to suppress images of 
false-identification documents discovered under a warrant for evidence related to another 
crime). U.S. Department of Justice guidelines note that it is good practice for agents to obtain a 
second warrant when they encounter evidence of a crime in plain view while conducting a 
computer search for evidence of a different crime. Lily R. Robinton, Courting Chaos: 
Conflicting Guidance from Courts Highlights the Need for Clearer Rules To Govern the Search 
and Seizure of Digital Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 311, 340 n.148 (2010); COMPUTER 
CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, supra note 154, at 90. 
 168. Compare Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276 (finding a Fourth Amendment violation when a 
police officer abandoned his computer search for drug-related evidence to search for child 
pornography after coming across an image of child pornography in his original warranted 
search), with United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 109295 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding no 
Fourth Amendment violation when an officer obtained a second warrant after encountering one 
image of child pornography during his search of a computer for evidence of illegal drug 
activity). 
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In contrast to this type of individualized determination, DNA 
samples are seized from all members of statutorily defined groups,169 
regardless of the applicability of DNA evidence to the case that 
brought the subject within the collection statute’s purview.170 Thus, 
when a person meets the statutory requirements—for example, by 
being convicted of using a revoked credit card—the state seizes her 
DNA as a matter of course, without suspicion that the person is 
involved in any unresolved crime, and regardless of the fact that her 
conviction obviates any use for her DNA in connection with the 
crime with which she was charged.171 So, although a suspect in a 
specific and unresolved crime maintains a privacy interest in the 
contents of a government-owned copy of her personal computer, 
lawful state seizure of a convict’s biological sample terminates her 
Fourth Amendment rights with regard to the genetic profile 
generated from that sample. Once the DNA is in the state’s hands, 
the police are free to examine its genetics, keep it in their database 
forever, and match it against any and all forensic DNA profiles, all 
without judicial authorization.172 
What accounts for this difference? Part of the explanation may 
be that invasion of electronic privacy is a specter that judges fear 
 
 169. See supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 1331 (noting that no mandatory collection statute 
“requires any findings of particularized need for collection—the onetime felonious bad-check 
writer convicted forty years ago must provide a sample alongside the incorrigible rapist”). 
 171. See ALA. CODE § 36-18-24(b)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (mandating collection of a 
DNA sample from all convicted felons); id. § 13A-9-14(b)(2), (e) (LexisNexis 2005) (designating 
the use of a revoked credit card as a felony). 
 172. See Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2004) (analogizing properly collected 
DNA to a fingerprint and noting that “the Fourth Amendment does not control how properly 
collected information is deployed”); State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 144 (Haw. 2003) (holding that 
once DNA is procured lawfully from a defendant, no privacy interest persists). But see Boroian 
v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2010) (“We do not hold . . . that once a DNA sample is 
lawfully extracted . . . , the individual necessarily loses a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to any subsequent use of that profile.”). Perversely, some courts find that categorical 
seizure in the absence of individualized suspicion bolsters the reasonableness of the seizures. See 
Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the DNA-collection statute 
meets the special-needs test precisely because the DNA is collected apart from any 
investigation, and thus cannot further ordinary law enforcement purposes); Shelton v. 
Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (“The standardized nature of the DNA 
collection process gives minimal discretion to the persons administering it . . . .”). But cf. 
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 53031 (1967) (“It is surely anomalous to say that the 
individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the 
individual is suspected of criminal behavior. For instance, even the most law-abiding citizen has 
a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may 
be broken by official authority . . . .”). 
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more than they fear DNA surveillance. Whereas judges have first-
hand knowledge of their own embarrassing computer habits and 
electronically stored information, they likely have only a fuzzy 
understanding of comparably basic facts about their genomes. But 
additionally, the classes of people subject to DNA-collection statutes 
are distinctly “other” than most judges and lawmakers. DNA statutes 
often apply only to our justice system’s collection of felons, violent 
offenders, and sex offenders,173 groups who are disproportionately 
African-American and poor.174 In contrast, suspects in computer 
crimes tend to be older, whiter, and wealthier than other categories of 
criminals.175 
Another key distinction is the differing conceptual frameworks 
into which courts have fitted computers and DNA. On the one hand, 
a majority of courts understand a computer hard drive to be 
something akin to “a container that stores thousands of individual 
[sub]containers in the form of discrete files,” each one of which is 
entitled to constitutional protection.176 On the other hand, courts 
conceptually freeze DNA in its physical form, making it and its 
associated profile a unitary “item of tangible property, such as a 
gun”177 that after seizure only “is examined, not ‘searched.’”178 The 
decision to view computers as containers of file-sized units of 
 
 173. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(B), (d) (2006) (requiring the director of the Bureau 
of Prisons to collect DNA from incarcerated felons, sex offenders, violent offenders, and 
offenders convicted of attempt or conspiracy to commit a felony, sex crime, or crime of 
violence). 
 174. Steven Raphael, The Socioeconomic Status of Black Males: The Increasing Importance 
of Incarceration, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION 319, 319 (Alan J. 
Auerbach, David Card & John M. Quigley eds., 2006); see also Kaye & Smith, supra note 4, at 
452 (“[N]early 30% of black males, but less than 5% of white males . . . [are] imprisoned on a 
felony conviction at some point in their lives.”). 
 175. See Goldfoot, supra note 153, at 16162 (writing specifically with regard to child-
pornography offenders). People arrested for such computer-intensive crimes as embezzlement 
and fraud also are largely white. See Crime in the United States, Table 43: Arrests by Race, 2010, 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/table-43 (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (illustrating that in 
2010, 66 percent of those convicted of fraud and 66.3 percent of those convicted of 
embezzlement were white). 
 176. Kerr, supra note 53, at 555; see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) 
(“Ever since 1878 . . . it has been settled that an officer’s authority to possess a package is 
distinct from his authority to examine its contents.”). But see United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 
449, 46465 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that one’s privacy interests in her computer are 
compromised fatally when police view any of the computer’s contents). 
 177. People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (App. Div. 1997). 
 178. Goldfoot, supra note 153, at 113. 
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information, however, is a construction not mandated by the nature 
of the computer device. A computer just as tenably could be divided 
into units of folders rather than files,179 or could be seen as a physical 
object that “does not contain things,” but rather “is one thing:” one 
hard drive, which, once seized, may be examined freely.180 Likewise, it 
also is possible to view DNA profiles as more informational than 
physical, and in terms of the relationships and presences they disclose, 
rather than the physical samples from which they are derived. 
C. Unreasonableness of the Current CODIS Search Paradigm 
Denying application of Fourth Amendment protections to 
CODIS searches by classifying DNA as a single, lawfully seized 
object misses the point of exactly how DNA-database searches 
violate reasonable privacy expectations. The greatest portion of the 
privacy invasion engendered by DNA surveillance comes not from 
the physical seizure and profiling of the sample, but from the 
repeated suspicionless CODIS searches that occur after the profile 
has been created.181 Therefore, to the extent that the physical DNA 
specimen is extracted by standard medical procedures and is profiled 
according to thirteen noncoding loci, current search procedures are 
indeed “reasonable” in relation to the invasions involved in that 
initial search.182 The real invasion of privacy arises when the subject’s 
genetic profile is compared to other genetic profiles one-hundred 
thousand times a day, for the rest of the subject’s life.183 These 
 
 179. See United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 94950 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (conceptualizing 
a computer’s component units in terms of folders). 
 180. Goldfoot, supra note 153, at 113. 
 181. See supra Part III.B. 
 182. See, e.g., Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he privacy 
invasion caused by a blood test is relatively small . . . . In Schmerber [v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966)], the Court upheld the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from a motorist 
suspected of driving while intoxicated, despite his refusal to consent to the intrusion. The Court 
noted that the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is minimal because such ‘tests are a 
commonplace . . . and . . . for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or 
pain.’” (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771)). This assumes the existence of adequate 
protections against government abuse of the sample and the profile, which is a contested 
proposition. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 1390–91 (suggesting that the impairment of negative 
liberty inheres in surveillance as exemplified by the psychological effect of knowing that one’s 
biometric profile is accessed repeatedly every day); cf. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444, 451–53 (1990) (clarifying that the Court’s holding that the sobriety checkpoint satisfied 
the special-needs test was limited to “the initial stop” and that “[d]etention of particular 
motorists for [a] more extensive” period “may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion 
standard”). 
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searches trample upon reasonable privacy expectations by tracking 
subjects’ biological relationships and physical whereabouts forever, 
divorced from any degree of suspicion that the subject engaged in any 
of the criminal activities in connection to which her profile is 
searched. It is in relation to these searches that current search 
procedures are wholly unreasonable. 
Formally, CODIS searches are presumptively unreasonable 
because they are searches conducted in the absence of a warrant.184 
However, as Professor Eve Primus has written, “[f]or some 
time, . . . experts have understood that warrantless searches are in 
practice common” and that “[a]s long as the government is 
reasonably pursuing a legitimate government interest, the warrant 
and probable cause requirements regularly fade away.”185 For this 
reason, CODIS searches’ similarities to constitutionally impermissible 
computer searches by general warrant are particularly helpful in 
highlighting the unreasonableness of the CODIS search paradigm. 
CODIS searches are, in essence, general-warrant computer 
searches turned on their head: instead of searching a single computer 
for evidence of any and every crime, DNA matching searches any and 
every CODIS subject for evidence of one particular crime (times one 
hundred thousand, every day).186 So, inasmuch as a computer search 
for evidence of any crime is an impermissible exploratory search,187 
and inasmuch as courts refuse the government’s request to “take [all 
of a suspect’s computer equipment] back to the lab, have a good look 
around and see what we might stumble upon,”188 courts also should 
 
 184. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). 
 185. Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 
255 (2011); see also supra notes 5860 and accompanying text. 
 186. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1391. 
 187. United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 188. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam). This case is a wonderful example of courts’ comparatively favorable privacy treatment 
of electronic evidence because its facts evoke medical-privacy concerns but also involve 
electronic recordkeeping. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that federal agents violated the 
Fourth Amendment when they seized and examined hundreds of baseball players’ steroid 
blood-test results because the agents had probable cause to examine only ten players’ records. 
Id. at 1170–72. The same court that upheld a suspicionless DNA-seizure statute, United States v. 
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 835 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), then ordered the government to return the 
unsuspected players’ test results in order to restore their privacy interests, which had been 
intolerably impaired by the seizure, Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1173. The 
outcome offers a particularly interesting parallel to issues of DNA-database searches, given that 
one might imagine that professional baseball players as a class are more likely than the general 
population to engage in illegal steroid use, just as once-incarcerated criminals as a class are 
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question a protocol that allows government agents to engage in 
fishing expeditions to connect DNA-database subjects with all and 
sundry crimes, none of which they actually suspect any of the subjects 
of committing.189 
D. Modifying Computer-Search Procedures for Application to DNA-
Database Searches 
By virtue of their continuing respect for owners’ privacy 
following computer seizures, courts’ treatment of computer searches 
offers an attractive solution to DNA-database searches’ problematic 
intermingling of relevant and irrelevant personal information. 
Moreover, computer and DNA-database searches threaten the same 
type of governmental abuse, making the same type of procedural 
protections appropriate. With computer searches, the danger is that 
police will go after a suspect for every crime for which they can find a 
scrap of evidence on the computer, regardless of the contours of their 
original suspicion.190 DNA-database searches amount to the same 
thing because CODIS searches are most realistically seen not as one-
off searches for the perpetrator of a single crime, but as a continuous 
stream of searches in which investigators hound CODIS subjects for 
every crime for which they have one scrap of evidence (a DNA 
sample) to compare. 
However, to account for the different logistical issues that arise 
in computer and DNA searches, some modifications should be made 
to the computer-search model before it is applied to genetic-profile 
searches. Specifically, courts should continue to allow initial 
suspicionless seizures of biological samples but should require a 
warrant and probable cause for later searches of the DNA profiles 
 
more likely than the general population to commit a future offense. See Mitchell Report: 
Baseball Slow To React to Players’ Steroid Use, ESPN.COM (Dec. 14, 2007, 11:29 AM ET), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3153509 (“Doping was widespread by stars as well 
as scrubs, the report said . . . .”); Eric Holder, Second Chances and Safer Communities, JUSTICE 
BLOG (May 24, 2012), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/2212 (“[R]oughly 40 percent of 
those released return to prison or jail within three years.”). 
 189. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 57172 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result) (explaining “that ‘exploratory searches . . . cannot be undertaken by officers with or 
without a warrant’” is a “basic constitutional rule” (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 
U.S. 56, 62 (1950))); cf. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (“[I]n a criminal 
investigation, the police may undertake to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But that 
public interest could hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that 
these goods might be found.”). 
 190. Or, in Professor Murphy’s formulation, the danger of the “overzealous, overstepping 
constable.” Murphy, supra note 4, at 830. 
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generated from those samples, and the biological samples themselves 
should be destroyed after the profiles are created. 
Suspicionless seizures and profiling should be allowed to 
continue because the seizures themselves invade privacy interests 
only minimally and because the government’s ability to store profiles 
of DNA taken from members of rationally drawn, statutorily 
prescribed groups is a valuable law enforcement tool. As many have 
argued, subjects suffer little as a direct result of biological-sample 
seizures because DNA-extraction procedures are relatively 
noninvasive,191 and because the profile by itself (as opposed to in 
comparison with other profiles) is basically innocuous.192 Additionally, 
suspicionless seizures and profiling allow the government to keep 
subjects’ identifying information on file and ready for use if a subject 
later becomes a suspect in an investigation. Thus, under such a 
system, the profiles actually would serve the true-identity function 
that proponents tout, and the profiles would be available for law 
enforcement use regardless of the later unavailability of the subject 
herself.193 However, to protect subjects’ privacy interests in their 
genetic material and definitively solve one facet of the information-
intermingling problem that DNA presents, courts should order the 
biological samples to be destroyed after the profile is created.194 
Then, as with post-seizure computer searches, courts should 
require the government to obtain a search warrant—based on 
probable cause to believe that the DNA profile to be searched will 
produce evidence of the crime under investigation—before the 
government is allowed to search a DNA profile that it created.195 
Requiring a warrant and probable cause would resolve the other facet 
 
 191. See Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 428 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he swabbing of saliva to 
obtain a DNA sample is even less invasive than the drawing of a blood sample.”); cf. Johnson v. 
Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Supreme Court precedent approving 
compelled blood-alcohol tests as a relatively small privacy invasion). 
 192. See Etzioni, supra note 95, at 217 (“[P]roponents of DNA databases argue that [genetic 
profiles] do not provide any meaningful information about individuals aside from allowing 
[analysts] to determine whether two samples come from the same person.”). 
 193. See supra notes 115118 and accompanying text. 
 194. In Wisconsin, the current policy is to destroy subjects’ biological samples after profiles 
are created. Suter, supra note 5, at 334 & n.172. That is likewise the policy in several European 
countries that maintain DNA databases. SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC 
JUSTICE: DNA DATABANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 182 (2011). 
 195. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy must 
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a 
policeman . . . .”). 
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of the information-intermingling problem by narrowing the returns 
on DNA searches to information likely to be relevant to the 
investigation, thereby minimizing needless privacy invasion and 
justifying what invasion does occur.196 Additionally, requiring a 
judge’s determination of probable cause before each search would 
reaffirm constitutional values by “interpos[ing] a magistrate between 
the citizen and the police,” instead of leaving CODIS subjects 
vulnerable to zealous officers’ determinations of when searching their 
genetic code is reasonable.197 
Ironically, in some respects, computer-search procedures even 
promise a more effective vindication of Fourth Amendment 
principles in the context of DNA evidence than they currently furnish 
to computer searches. For instance, commentators such as Josh 
Goldfoot have criticized as formalistic the requirement that, in 
conducting a computer search, police must obtain a second warrant in 
order to pursue evidence of a crime that they discover in the process 
of their initial warranted search: “Formally, [the second warrant] 
authorizes the officer to search for new things on the same hard drive. 
Practically, it simply lets the officer examine evidence that he already 
has, so that he can read what he has already read.”198 The quandary 
arises because in searching a computer, officers must open every file, 
as computers can be configured to misdirect or deceive.199 Thus, the 
multiple-warrant requirement provides only formal privacy 
protections to subjects of computer searches because it does not 
actually save their personal files from investigators’ prying eyes. 
Rather, its only real consequence is to disallow the state’s use of 
computer evidence of the extrawarranted crime at trial if the 
investigator failed to obtain a second warrant before searching for the 
extrawarranted evidence.200 
Genetic-profile searches are not subject to the same practical 
constraints. Instead of storing information in scattered and misleading 
 
 196. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (“[A]ny intrusion in the way of 
search or seizure is an evil, so . . . no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior 
determination of necessity.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 197. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). 
 198. Goldfoot, supra note 153, at 144. 
 199. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 88990 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 200. Goldfoot, supra note 153, at 14445; see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“The problem can be stated very 
simply: There is no way to be sure exactly what an electronic file contains without somehow 
examining its contents . . . .”). 
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locations, DNA-profile information is tucked tidily away in the 
government’s database, making it easy for police to isolate and search 
some profiles without disturbing others. As a result, requiring a 
warrant to search specified profiles in the government’s possession 
would be an extremely effective means of limiting the government’s 
needless exposure of unsuspected subjects’ private information, but it 
would not compromise the effectiveness of the government’s search 
of the relevant subjects’ profiles. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus far, judges have sanctioned legislatures’ creation of a 
multistep DNA-database search process whereby the reasonableness 
and minimal invasiveness of the first step are permitted to shield later 
steps’ intrusions from constitutional scrutiny. The extraction of blood 
and the generation of a genetic profile from noncoding sites on the 
genome may intrude only slightly upon a subject’s privacy interests. 
However, considered in those terms, the government’s interest in 
possessing the blood and profile also is slight. The value of the genetic 
profile, both to police and to the subject’s privacy, exists only when 
the genetic profile is compared with other profiles because only then 
can the profile disclose information about biological relationships and 
physical movements. Therefore, to address the real governmental and 
privacy interests at stake, the Fourth Amendment discussion of 
DNA-collection statutes should begin at the point of comparison—
not at the point of extraction. This Note has attempted to do just that 
and has argued that because DNA-database subjects have an actual 
and reasonable expectation of privacy in their genetic profiles even 
after their biological samples are in government hands, DNA-
database searches are “searches” under the Fourth Amendment. 
This Note also has argued that DNA-database searches are 
unreasonable as they are currently conducted because they lack 
individualized suspicion and warrant authorization and because they 
so closely resemble general-warrant computer searches. It has further 
argued that computer-search procedures suggest a constitutionally 
preferable alternative because those procedures were developed to 
guard against the same kind of danger posed by unrestrained DNA-
database searches and because they recognize continuing reasonable 
expectations of privacy following a government seizure. The only 
question that remains, then, is a normative one: as a society, do we 
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really believe that a computer is more deserving of privacy 
protections than our DNA? 
